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Resuscitating Roberts? How Courts Should
Construe the "Emergency" Exception to the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
by SLOAN A. HEFFRON*
[O]ur readers will probably feel no hesitation in adopting the
language of Mr. Justice Gawdy respecting the trial, namely, that "the
justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the
condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh."
The Court grandly declares that "[w]e leave for another day any
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial." But
the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of
state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds
of 'testimony" the Court lists is covered by the new rule. They need
them now, not months or years from now. Rules of criminal
evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the country, and
parties should not be left in the dark in this manner.2
-Justice Rehnquist
Introduction
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause has received
considerable attention on the United States Supreme Court's criminal
docket in recent years. For decades, prosecutors routinely relied upon the
lax standard promulgated by the Court in Ohio v. Roberts.
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., 2008,
University of California, Berkeley. Many thanks to Professors Kate Bloch and Roger Park for
their valuable insights. I am particularly grateful to Professor Rory K. Little, whose guidance and
wisdom have been invaluable.
1. D. Jardine, CRIMINAL TRIALs 520 (London, Charles Knight 1832).
2. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75-76 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Under Roberts, the prosecution was required to
satisfy a two-pronged test when offering out-of-court statements. The first prong, unavailability,
required the prosecutor to either produce the declarant or establish that the declarant is
unavailable. The second prong, reliability, required that the hearsay statement at issue possess
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However, since the Court's landmark ruling in Crawford v.
Washington,4 the unambiguous requirements under Roberts gave way to a
less clear and indeed, less developed standard. Following Crawford,
various factual scenarios have arisen involving out-of-court statements
made by declarants unavailable at trial. Consequently, the Court has
granted certiorari on issues ranging from whether Crawford's ban on
testimonial hearsays can be applied retroactively,6 to the extent of a
prosecutor's ability to introduce affidavits signed by non-testifying forensic
analysts at trial.
In this resurgence of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, lower courts
have struggled to interpret the Court's use of specific terms, as well the
rationales underlying its decisions. In February of 2011, the Court may
have added to the confusion when it handed down its opinion in Michigan
v. Bryant, a homicide case in which the Court considered whether the
statements of a dying man made to police were testimonial and therefore
inadmissible. 9 The majority, led by Justice Sotomayor, articulated the test
to be applied in differentiating testimonial hearsay from statements deemed
sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial:
[W]hen a court must determine whether the Confrontation Clause
bars the admission of a statement at trial, it should determine the
"primary purpose of the interrogation" by objectively evaluating the
statements and actions of the parties to the encounter, in light of the
circumstances in which the interrogation occurs. The existence of an
emergency or the parties' perception that an emergency is ongoing is
among the most important circumstances that courts must take into
account in determining whether an interrogation is testimonial
because statements made to assist police in addressing an ongoing
sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, meaning that it fall within a "firmly-rooted exception" to the
hearsay rule or bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id at 66.
4. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
5. As provided in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), an out-of-court
statement is testimonial "when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Likewise, a statement is non-
testimonial "when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency." Id.
6. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
7. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
8. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial," 71
BROOK. L. REV. 241, 266-67 n.54 (2005) (demonstrating several lower courts' confusion and
perceived misinterpretation of the Court's use of "testimonial" as it related to the Confrontation
Clause).
9. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
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emergency presumably lack the testimonial purpose that would
subject them to . . . confrontation .... [T]he existence and duration
of an emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed to
the victim, the police, and the public.'o
Although the Court provides several factors to be weighed in
considering the existence of an "ongoing emergency,"" it does not make
any firm determination as to when an emergency actually begins or ends.12
In fact, the majority explicitly declines to provide such a standard, and
instead merely acknowledges that the emergency in Bryant did not
continue until the defendant was arrested in California a year after the
shooting." Aside from the few guiding factors offered in the Bryant
opinion,14 it appears that trial courts and the parties before them are without
much in the way of instruction that will enable them to distinguish
statements made in the course of an ongoing emergency from testimonial
ones.
This paper argues that in the wake of Crawford, Davis, and Bryant,
trial courts need a workable definition of "ongoing emergency," as well as
a test or set of guidelines that can be applied in assessing the admissibility
of statements made under such circumstances. In essence, this paper seeks
to answer two important questions now confronting trial courts: (1) What is
an "ongoing emergency," and (2) what set of factors can enable a trial court
to establish the existence of an ongoing emergency?
Ultimately, in defining "ongoing emergency," this paper borrows from
earlier Supreme Court rulings in the Fourth Amendment context. For
purposes of the Confrontation Clause, this paper defines "ongoing
emergency" the same way the Court has previously defined "exigent
circumstances": A situation in which "there is an imminent risk of death or
10. Id. at 1162.
11. See id. at 1163-65 (acknowledging factors such as the presence of a weapon, an absence
of knowledge regarding the identity or whereabouts of an assailant, and a declarant's concerns
over the need for emergency medical services). Justice Scalia's dissent also provides a list of
factors he believes the Court found determinative in Bryant. Id. at 1175-76 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
12. Id. at 1164.
13. Id. at 1164-65 ("We need not decide precisely when the emergency ended because
[victim's] encounter with the police and all of the statements he made during that interaction
occurred within the first few minutes of the police officers' arrival and well before they secured
the scene of the shooting-the shooter's last known location.").
14. See id at 1163-65 (acknowledging factors such as the presence of a weapon, an absence
of knowledge regarding the identity or whereabouts of an assailant, and a declarant's concerns
over the need for emergency medical services). Justice Scalia's dissent also provides a list of
factors he believes the Court found determinative in Bryant. Id. at 1175-76 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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serious injury, or danger that evidence will be immediately destroyed" for
the purpose of hindering future prosecution, "or that a suspect will
escape."' This definition is relied upon in part because it is offered, in
dissent, by Justice Ginsburg, a vocal critic of the Court's apparent retreat
from Crawford. It is also relied upon, in part, because it seems to stand up
to most situations in which officers might obtain statements from a
declarant not solely for the purpose of preserving testimony for future
prosecution.
This paper also prescribes a flexible totality-of-the-circumstances test
that courts can apply in ascertaining whether the facts surrounding a
declarant's statement does, in fact, constitute an emergency. The test
places great emphasis on whether the facts create a situation in which the
declarant's statement bears sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant
admission. In Part I of this paper, I provide a discussion of the current state
of the Confrontation Clause and some of the problems that have transpired
in the wake of Crawford.
In Part II, I offer hypothetical examples of scenarios in which the lack
of an existing framework for identifying an "ongoing emergency" may lead
to confusing and potentially undesirable outcomes. I also discuss the need
for the Court's clarification on this matter.
Finally, in Part III, I analogize to the "emergency" exceptions to the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. I then provide a proposal of how the Court
might define "ongoing emergency," and articulate a totality-of-the-
circumstances test to guide lower courts in assessing the admissibility of
such evidence.
I. Issues Surrounding the Confrontation Clause
A. The Abandonment of Roberts and the Emergence of a New Standard
For nearly a quarter-century, federal and state courts were governed
by the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ohio v.
Roberts.'6 In Roberts, the defendant was charged in state court with check
forgery and receiving stolen credit cards.' 7 At trial, the prosecution offered
the preliminary hearing transcript, documenting the testimony of a defense
witness who provided testimony unfavorable to the defendant at the
15. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1864 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
16. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
17. Id. at 58.
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preliminary hearing and was unavailable at trial.18  Over the defendant's
Confrontation Clause objection, the trial court admitted the transcript.19
The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. 20  The Ohio court of
appeals reversed, and the state supreme court affirmed that ruling.21
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, holding that where a hearsay declarant is not present for
cross-examination, his previous out-of-court statements can overcome a
Confrontation Clause challenge upon a showing that (1) he is unavailable
and (2) his statement bears "adequate indicia of reliability." 22  Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, explained that reliability "can be
inferred without more ... where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception," leaving open the possibility of there being additional
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" beyond the exceptions that
would also suffice.23 This standard endured for nearly twenty-five years,
despite being implicated in several cases following Roberts.24 It was not
until March 8, 2004, that the Court's Confrontation Clause rulings took a
dramatic change of course.
In Crawford v. Washington, the defendant was accused of assault and
attempted murder following a dispute in which he stabbed a man who
allegedly tried to rape his wife.25 Following the incident, the defendant's
wife provided police with a tape-recorded statement in which she described
the stabbing.26 At trial, the defendant's wife refused to testify, invoking
Washington's marital privilege. 2 7
In lieu of the wife's testimony, the prosecution offered her tape-
recorded statements to the police-not barred by the privilege-which lent
support to the argument that the defendant was the aggressor.28 Over the
18. Id. at 59. It is worth noting that despite the nature of the testimony, the defendant did
not ask that the witness be deemed hostile, nor did the prosecution conduct any examination of
the witness. Id. at 58.
19. Id. at 59-60.
20. Id at 60.
21. Id
22. Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality opinion); Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346 (1992); Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116
(1999).
25. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 40.
28. Id.
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defendant's Confrontation Clause objection, the trial court admitted the
recording, finding it to be a statement against penal interest and thus,
falling within a firmly rooted exception to the rule against hearsay. 29 The
defendant was convicted of assault.3 0
Although the Washington court of appeals reversed, the state supreme
court reinstated the conviction. 3 1 The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorari.
In overruling Roberts, the Crawford majority-led by Justice Scalia-
imposed a more inflexible standard for evaluating out-of-court statements
from an unavailable witness.32 The Court held that in order for testimonial
evidence to be admissible, the Sixth Amendment "demands what the
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." 3 3
The Court noted that the new rule had supplanted Roberts' "vague
standards" and "open-ended balancing tests" which were too easily
manipulated.34 By his own admission, Justice Scalia noted the fact, raised
in Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence,3 5 that the Crawford opinion fails
to articulate a workable definition of what constitutes "testimonial,"
thereby leaving trial courts in the dark: "We leave for another day any
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."' 36
That day arrived over two years later, in June 2006, when Justice
Scalia and a unanimous majority attempted to define "testimonial"
statements and distinguish them from "non-testimonial" ones in Davis v.
Washington. In Davis, the Court considered two separate state court
29. Id. The statements sufficed as statements against the wife's interests in that she admitted
leading the defendant to the victim's apartment and "facilitat[ing] the assault." Id.
30. Id. at 41.
31. Id.
32. Id at 68.
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("The Court grandly declares that '[w]e leave
for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' But the
thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to
what beyond the specific kinds of 'testimony' the Court lists is covered by the new rule. They
need them now, not months or years from now. Rules of criminal evidence are applied every day
in courts throughout the country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this manner.")
(citations omitted).
36. Id. at 68. See also id. at 68 n.10 (explaining that the Court's refusal to provide a
workable definition will inevitably lead to "interim uncertainty," but apparently priding itself on
the fact that "it can hardly be any worse than the status quo," referring to Roberts as "inherently,
and therefore permanently, unpredictable").
37. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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convictions involving defendants accused of domestic violence offenses.38
In both cases, the issue presented was how courts are to differentiate
"testimonial" out-of-court statements from "non-testimonial" ones. 3 9
Because Crawford ruled that the Confrontation Clause is only applicable to
"witnesses,"4-regarded as "those who 'bear testimony"'41-the Court
was forced to address what constitutes "testimonial" statements for
purposes of confrontation.42
In answering this question and reaching its holdings, the Court clearly
distinguished between statements given in order to address a present
emergency, and those given in any other context:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or grove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
Applied to the facts of each case, this ruling had different outcomes.
In one case, Davis, the Court held that statements made by a domestic
violence victim to a 911 operator identifying her attacker during a frantic
phone call were non-testimonial and therefore admissible.44 "The
difference between the interrogation in Davis and the one in Crawford is
apparent on the face of things," Scalia explained.4 5 "In Davis, McCottry
38. Id. The case names are Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, both consolidated
under Davis v. Washington.
39. Id. at 817.
40. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
41. Id.
42. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (acknowledging that Crawford did not offer any definition for
"testimonial," except to note that "'[w]e use [it] . . . in its colloquial, rather than any technical
legal, sense,' and that 'one can imagine various definitions. . . and we need not select among
them in this case."').
43. Id. The Court also made clear that its holding did not automatically render statements
made outside of an interrogation (i.e., volunteered information) non-testimonial: "The Framers
were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to
open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation." Id. at 822 n.1.
44. Id. at 829.
45. Id. at 827.
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[the 911 caller] was speaking about events as they were actually
happening, rather than 'describ[ing] past events." A6
Scalia further distinguished Davis, noting that McCottry gave her
hysterical answers to the operator's questions by phone, in an environment
that was neither tranquil nor safe. 47 Thus, the circumstances of McCottry's
interrogation indicate that she "simply was not acting as a witness; she was
not testifying," and her statements were not "'a weaker substitute for live
testimony' at trial.'
By contrast, the Court found the statements used to convict the
defendant in Davis' companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, to be testimonial
hearsay and therefore barred by the Confrontation Clause.49 There, the
victim prepared a handwritten battery affidavit in the presence of officers
following her attack.o In finding the contents of the victim's affidavit
inadmissible, the Court explained that such statements are testimonial
"when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency ... and . . . the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."5 1 Ironically, in the wake of Crawford and Davis-decisions
in which the Court acknowledged its goal of promulgating a Confrontation
Clause analysis that was both predictable and faithful to the text of the
Sixth Amendment-lower courts have been left with an unpredictable and
confusing rule that has led to numerous interpretational problems, as
discussed below.
B. Problems in the Wake of Crawford and Davis
Without question, Crawford marked a significant departure from the
Confrontation Clause analysis courts had grown accustomed to applying
under Roberts. Since 2004, criminal trial courts have faced a constitutional
mandate to consider out-of-court statements by unavailable declarants in a
new and confusing way. It is thus unsurprising that trial court judges have
sought to embrace terminology and tests with which they feel more
comfortable as they navigate these relatively uncharted waters. The term
46. Id. (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)). Despite Scalia's contention, at
least one scholar has found this distinction to be unfounded, explaining that by the time McCottry
actually made her 911 call, it was apparent that the attack had effectively ended and Davis had
left the room. Richard D. Friedman, Crawford and Davis: A Personal Reflection, 19 REGENT U.
L. REv. 303, 307 (2007).
47. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
48. Id. at 828 (citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
49. Davis, 547 U.S. at 831-32.
50. Id at 820.
51. Id at 822.
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"ongoing emergency" represents precisely such a term. As one
commentator suggests, trial court judges need some guidance:
This preference for the emergency idea is understandable. We have
entered a brave new world of confrontation jurisprudence in which
virtually no judges have experience applying even its basic
governing principles. It makes sense that judges gravitate toward a
concept that at least seems to strike a familiar note with respect to
other areas of criminal procedure [citing the Fourth Amendment's
"exigent circumstances" exception and the Fifth Amendment's
"public safety emergency" exception]. Furthermore, the unadorned
concept of an emergency is flexible enough that many appellate
courts can recite it, comfortable in the knowledge that as a test, it
will not stand in the way of reaching their desired, pre-Crawford
result: upholding the admission of absent victims' statements
alleging potentially criminal behavior, often some kind of domestic
violence.
Despite the use of a somewhat familiar "ongoing emergency"
exception, the difficulty courts at all levels have encountered in
implementing the exception is well-reflected in rulings handed down by
both state supreme courts and the United States Supreme Court itself.
In State v. Kirby, a kidnapping victim escaped from the car her
kidnapper was driving.53 Upon arriving home, the woman called the police
and, over the phone, described what had happened. 5 4 The following day, in
an unrelated incident, the victim died after falling down the stairs in her
home.55 The defendant was charged with second-degree kidnapping, two
counts of first-degree burglary, and one count of assault.5 6 At trial, the
court admitted into evidence the entire 911 call, over the defendant's
Confrontation Clause objection. The defendant was convicted on the
kidnapping and assault charges.58
On appeal, the State argued that the victim's statements were made in
the course of an "ongoing public safety emergency," thereby rendering
them non-testimonial.59 The Connecticut Supreme Court found otherwise,
52. Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened-and What is Happening-to the Confrontation
Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 587, 589-90 (2007).
53. State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2006).
54. Id. at 512-14.
55. Id at 516.
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id at 523 n.19.
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explaining that "accepting the state's arguments on this point . .. would
render virtually any telephone report of a past violent crime in which a
suspect was still at large, no matter the timing of the call, into the report of
a 'public safety emergency."' 0
In a separate case, the United States Supreme Court also considered a
prosecutor's "ongoing emergency" rationale. In February 2011, the Court
handed down a ruling in Michigan v. Bryant, in which it considered the
admissibility of statements made to police officers by a mortally wounded
gunshot victim laying in a gas station parking lot mere hours before his
death.61
In his statements, the victim identified and described his shooter, and
provided officers with the location of where the shooting had occurred.62
At trial, the victim's statements were admitted under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule.63 A jury convicted the defendant, Bryant, of
second-degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Bryant
appealed to the Michigan court of appeals, citing Crawford, which had
been decided five months earlier. 6 4  The court of appeals affirmed the
* * 65convictions.
Bryant appealed the ruling, and the Michigan Supreme Court
remanded the case to the court of appeals to be reconsidered in light of
Davis.66 On remand, the court of appeals again affirmed, holding that the
challenged statements were non-testimonial and were therefore
admissible.6 7 Bryant again appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court,
which reversed his conviction, citing that admission of the contested
statements constituted plain error in light of Crawford and Davis.68 The
United State Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In finding the statements admissible, the Court, led by Justice
Sotomayor, held that the circumstances surrounding the interaction
"objectively indicate that the 'primary purpose of the interrogation' was 'to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."' 69 Thus, the
60. Id
61. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
62. Id. at 1150.
63. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3, Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150).
64. Id. at 1150-51.
65. Id. at 1150.
66. Id at 1150-51.
67. Id. at 1151.
68. Id
69. Id. at 1166-67 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822(2006)).
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Court reasoned, the statements were not testimonial, and their admission at
Bryant's trial did not violate his right to confrontation.
Interestingly, the Bryant Court's majority was sharply critiqued by
Justice Scalia, author of the Crawford and Davis majority opinions. In a
scathing dissent, Scalia begins by expressing his dismay not only at what
he considers to be a gross departure from Crawford, but also at the
majority's nalvety in reaching its holding:
Today's tale-a story of five officers conducting successive
examinations of a dying man with the primary purpose, not of
obtaining and preserving his testimony regarding his killer, but of
protecting him, them, and others from a murderer somewhere on the
loose-is so transparently false that professing to believe it demeans
this institution.7
Scalia goes on to point out several perceived flaws in the majority's
approach. First, he repudiates the Court's test, which focuses in part on
whose perspective is significant in determining the primary purpose of an
interrogation.72 In rejecting the Court's suggestion that the perspective of
both the declarant and the interrogator should be considered in determining
the underlying purpose of the statement, Scalia pulls no punches.
Characterizing the majority's analysis as "an unsuccessful attempt to make
its finding of emergency plausible," Scalia expresses his disdain at the
adoption of a test that looks to the objective purposes of both the declarant
and his interrogators.73
Instead, Scalia opts for a declarant-centered inquiry, noting that "[t]he
hidden purpose of an interrogator cannot substitute for the declarant's
intentional solemnity or his understanding of how his words may be
used."7 4 In other words, police can easily offer a pretextual explanation as
to their intentions in questioning an out-of-court declarant, when in reality
their underlying goal is little more than to obtain testimony. Accordingly,
Scalia contends that the interrogator's purpose is of little consequence.
70. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167.
71. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id at 1169.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1168 ("Crawford and Davis did not address whose perspective matters-the
declarant's, the interrogator's, or both-when assessing 'the primary purpose of [an]
interrogation.' In those cases the statements were testimonial from any perspective. I think the
same is true here, but because the Court picks a perspective so will I: The declarant's intent is
what counts."). Interestingly, despite the contentions in his Bryant dissent, as well as the fact that
Scalia himself authored the majority opinion in Davis, that case did not hold the victim's
871
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A logical counterargument to this point was raised by Justice Alito
during oral arguments:
In a situation like this, do you think it's meaningful to ask what the
primary purpose of the victim was when he responded to the police
and said who shot him?
You have a man who has just been shot. He has a wound that's
going to turn out to be fatal, and he's lying there on the ground
bleeding profusely, and he says: My primary purpose in saying this
is so that they can respond to an ongoing emergency ... but I also
have the purpose of giving them information that could be used at
trial, but it's ... a little bit less my purpose than res onding to the
ongoing emergency. It seems like it's totally artificial. 6
This split between Scalia and the Bryant majority poses an interesting
dilemma to lower courts attempting to determine the primary purpose of an
interrogation and whether the resulting statements are testimonial. As one
commentator noted, the majority's "combined approach" is difficult to
apply, as trial courts are without guidance as to how to address the "mixed-
motive" problem in which police and witnesses have dual or conflicting
motives.77 Further, in such a case, how are courts to determine whether the
objective intents of the out-of-court declarants and the police are to carry
the same weight?78
On the other hand, and in accord with Justice Alito's reasoning, is the
fact that even if trial courts embrace Justice Scalia's declarant-centered
approach, it is still impossible to know for certain what the declarant's
primary purpose actually was.7 9 An "objective assessment" is likely the
best trial courts can hope to do. Unfortunately, regardless of which answer
to the question a court decides on, it is but one part of the current
Confrontation Clause analysis.
statements to be testimonial. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006). The Court did,
however, find the statements made by the victim in Davis' companion case, Hammon, to be
testimonial. See id. at 831-32.
76. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7-8, Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument-transcripts/09-150.pdf.
77. Jodlle Anne Moreno, Finding Nino: Justice Scalia's Confrontation Clause Legacy from
its (Glorious) Beginning to (Bitter) End, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1211, 1217 n.31 (2011). An example
of this would be when a victim makes a statement to officers with the intent of the statement
being used for prosecutorial purposes, whereas the police obtain the statement in hopes of
assuring the immediate safety of the victim and others.
78. Id.
79. See also Craig M. Bradley, Further Confusion Over Confrontation, 47 TRIAL 52, 54
(2011).
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A second factor-taken directly from Davisso-is the determination of
whether a statement is made in the course of an ongoing emergency. In
Bryant, the Court does little in the way of providing a working definition of
"ongoing emergency." Instead, Justice Sotomayor takes the Michigan
Supreme Court to task, noting that the court "repeatedly and incorrectly
asserted that Davis 'defined' 'ongoing emergency."' 81  Interestingly,
despite its reference to a definition of "ongoing emergency" allegedly
provided by Davis, the Michigan court does not reiterate the "definition,"
instead offering several reasons why the duration of such an emergency is
limited.82
In response, Justice Sotomayor makes clear that, whatever might
constitute an ongoing emergency, whether such a condition exists is merely
one factor-"albeit an important" one-that "informs the ultimate inquiry
regarding the 'primary purpose' of an interrogation."83  Elsewhere in the
opinion, Sotomayor acknowledges the two additional factors which aid in
the determination of whether a statement is testimonial: The "objective
intent" of the parties involved, and the "formality" of the encounter
between a declarant and police.
To some extent, these factors are interrelated, and as the Bryant
majority suggests, no factor in and of itself is solely determinative of the
"ultimate" primary purpose inquiry.86 A definition of "formality," a term
discussed by the Court in Davis,87 seems to correspond to a relatively
straightforward concept. As one commentator suggested, "formality"
seems to hint at statements resembling "affidavits, depositions, prior
80. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) ("We conclude from all this that the
circumstances of McCottry's interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. She simply was not acting as a witness; she was
not testifying.") (emphasis in original).
81. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158 (citing People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Mich. 2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1156.
85. Id. at 1160.
86. Id
87. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006) ("[T]he difference in the level of
formality between the two interviews [in Crawford and in Davis] is striking. Crawford was
responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator
taping and making notes of her answers; McCottry's frantic answers were provided over the
phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator
could make out) safe.").
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testimony, or confessions,", in other words, statements bearing a
semblance of ritual and procedure in anticipation of litigation.
Ultimately, the issue of objective intent and whose perspective is
significant for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis seems relatively
unsettled, as noted above. 8 9  However, that is beyond the scope of this
paper and, at least in the eyes of the Bryant majority, an issue that appears
to have been resolved in favor of an approach looking to the perspective of
witnesses and interrogators alike. 90
Despite Justice Sotomayor's acknowledgment that the Court had yet
to provide a definition of "ongoing emergency," the Bryant majority
nonetheless failed to articulate any workable definition when given the
opportunity. To say that determining whether such a situation has arisen is
"a highly context-dependent inquiry" is not altogether untrue, yet it does
little in the way of aiding a trial court that has been tasked with ascertaining
the primary purpose of an interrogation.91
Justice Scalia is not the only critic of the Bryant decision. Professor
Friedman has suggested that Bryant represents "a very unfortunate
development for the Confrontation Clause." 92 "The approach that emerges
is remarkably mushy, unjustified by any sound reasoning and virtually
incoherent. It leaves courts ample room in many types of cases to
characterize almost any type of statement as non-testimonial. It will be
easily manipulable by governmental authorities and at times may distort
their behavior," Friedman explains.9 3
Not only is Professor Friedman right in his recognition of Bryant's
malleable standard, he also provides a cogent explanation as to what forced
the Court so far in that direction. "[T]his decision is in large part a result of
the Supreme Court's error in unduly restricting the scope of forfeiture
doctrine in Giles v. California.9 4  In this case, there was substantial
88. See 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6371.2 (Supp. 2006).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 62-79.
90. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.8 ("The existence of an ongoing emergency must be
objectively assessed from the perspective of the parties to the interrogation at the time, not with
the benefit of hindsight.").
91. Id. at 1158-60.
92. Richard Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision, THE CONFRONTATION
BLOG (March 2, 2011, 12:42 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com
/2011/03/preliminary-thoughts-on-bryant-decision.html.
93. Id.
94. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). In Giles, the Court, led again by Justice Scalia,
held that unconfronted testimonial statements made by a declarant unavailable at trial are not
made admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause
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evidence, easily enough to justify a finding, that Bryant had killed
Covington and therefore that he himself was at least the initial cause of his
inability to cross-examine Covington," Friedman notes. 9 5 "Accordingly, a
court easily could have held that Bryant forfeited the confrontation right-
had Giles not foreclosed the possibility by holding that even a defendant
who murders a witness forfeits the right only if he commits the murder for
the purpose of rendering the witness unavailable." 96 Thus, the "bottom-line
result of the Michigan Supreme Court's decision-that Covington's
statements were inadmissible-is singularly unappealing at a gut level,"
and signifies the inevitable result that "courts would compensate for the
unavailability of forfeiture in cases like this by narrowing the confrontation
right."97
Professor Friedman's analysis of both Bryant and Giles puts into
perspective the reality of the current state of the Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. While Crawford signifies a significant turning point
in confrontation rights and requirements, and has been widely praised by
many-including Friedman himself 98-the cases that have come in its
wake, including Davis and Giles, have forced the Court into a position
where a result like Bryant is seemingly unavoidable. In short, Crawford
was a difficult pill for prosecutors to swallow, and this difficulty has only
been exacerbated by further expansion of the Confrontation right in cases
such as Giles. Thus, Bryant represents a step back from Crawford in that it
appears to create a broad and uncertain exception to Crawford's
confrontation right. How broad the "ongoing emergency" exception is,
however, remains unclear.
Given that "[r]ules of criminal evidence are applied every day in
courts throughout the country," it behooves the Court to promptly delineate
a straightforward standard that can keep parties from being "left in the
dark" on this matter.9 9
absent a showing that the defendant intended to make the witness unavailable so that the witness
could not testify in court. Id
95. Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision, supra note 92.
96. Id
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Friedman, Crawford and Davis: A Personal Reflection, supra note 46; see also
Richard Friedman, Confrontation as a Hot Topic: The Virtues of Going Back to Square One, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 1041 (2003) (Friedman makes a pre-Crawford proposal as to how the Court
should construe the Confrontation Clause. In Crawford, the Court did, in fact, go on to embrace
this approach.).
99. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75-76 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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II. "Ongoing Emergency" Examples and Standards
Under Crawford and Bryant, there are various scenarios in which
applying the Court's "ongoing emergency" analysis may lead to results that
are either confusing, undesirable, or both. Take, for instance, a case
involving grand theft from an electronics store. While this is hardly the
case of the century, the simple facts provide a straightforward example of
the difficulties that can arise.
Envision a scenario in which a relatively inexperienced off-duty police
officer is shopping in an electronics store. While in the store, the officer
observes the suspicious behavior of a man with whom the officer had had
prior crime-related contacts. After briefly observing the man's suspicious
behavior from an inconspicuous vantage point within the store, the officer
observes the man walk out the store's exit carrying what appears to be a
packaged television valued at approximately $1,000. Assume that the man
does not see the off-duty officer. Unsure as to whether or not the man paid
for the television, the officer approaches a sales clerk and, without
identifying himself as a police officer, inquires as to the man's actions.
The sales clerk informs the officer that she did not personally observe
the man pay for the television. She also states that earlier in the day, there
were three packaged televisions on the store's shelf. "Now," the clerk
explains, "there are only two."
Clearly, the clerk's statements serve as strong evidence of the
suspect's wrongdoing. They may also be extremely useful in informing the
officer's own determination as to whether he should confront the suspect at
that moment.100 Presumably, each passing moment marks a decrease in the
likelihood of locating the suspect while in possession of the television. The
suspect could easily pawn off the television or store it in a location where
police might never find it. Thus, if the television is in fact stolen, the
officer has a strong interest in preserving the physical evidence in this case
and catching the suspect in possession of the television while in the vicinity
of the store.
After questioning the store clerk, the officer hurries outside to the
store's parking lot. There, he observes the man, who he suspects of theft,
placing the packaged television in the backseat of his car. The officer
approaches the suspect and questions him about the television. Despite the
suspect's claim that he owned the television and was merely trying to
100. Thus, the clerk's statements may be offered either (1) as evidence of the man's
wrongdoing, or (2) not for the truth of the matter asserted, but instead as the basis for the officer's
actions thereafter. Clearly, because the prosecution would prefer the statements be considered as
evidence, admitting the statements under the former is preferable to the later.
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return it, the officer believes he has probable cause to arrest the suspect for
the theft, and he proceeds to do so.
Although the suspect was caught with the television in his possession
and cannot provide a receipt for it, the officer foolishly decides to return
the item directly to the store instead of booking it into evidence as he
should have done. The television is eventually sold by the store and, as a
result of poor police work, the state is without a piece of physical evidence
central to its case.
Notwithstanding this glaring problem, because the suspect has a
lengthy criminal history, the assistant district attorney decides to file a
felony grand theft charge. In the course of pre-trying the case, the
prosecutor conveys a plea offer to the suspect-turned-defendant. The
defendant rejects the offer and the case proceeds to a preliminary hearing.
At the hearing, the prosecutor relies on the testimony of the arresting
officer and a store manager, through whom the prosecutor admits
surveillance video showing the defendant entering the store empty-handed
and leaving with the television. Without relying on the statements of the
sales clerk, the defendant is held to answer, and the case is transferred to a
felony trial court. The defendant continues to reject the state's offer and
the case proceeds to trial.
The prosecutor intends to introduce the statements of the store's sales
clerk to the officer in order to establish that after the defendant left, there
was one less television than there previously had been. Before trial, the
prosecutor learns that the clerk no longer works at the store, has since left
the state to attend college, and cannot be reached. Consequently, the
prosecutor informs the court and the defendant's attorney that he plans to
introduce the statements as present sense impressions.
The defendant's attorney objects to the admission of the clerk's
statements on Confrontation Clause grounds, arguing that the statements
are testimonial and that the clerk has not been made available for cross-
examination. The prosecutor, citing to Bryant, argues that the statements
are not testimonial because their "primary purpose .. . was to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."10' Assuming that the
statements would strengthen the state's case against the defendant, how
should the trial court rule on their admissibility?
There are several issues to consider in this case. First, the prosecutor
may want to argue that the police officer, acting in an off-duty capacity,
was not truly an "agent of law enforcement" and that therefore, the
101. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 822 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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statements were not truly testimonial.102 While this reasoning is tenuous
for various reasons,t0 3 if the court were to entertain this argument, its ruling
might turn on whether the store clerk was somehow aware that the man
asking her about the defendant was a police officer.
This, in turn, would raise concerns acknowledged in Bryant regarding
the purposes underlying the questioning from the viewpoint of both the
interrogator (here, the officer) and the declarant (the clerk).10 4 Specifically,
what will the court view as the clerk's "objective" primary purpose in
making her statement to the officer?'05  Did she even suspect a television
had been stolen? If so, did she foresee that her statements could be used in
a later prosecution? Alternatively, did the clerk merely intend to aid in the
recovery of the television? Could she have possibly intended both,
resulting in the "mixed motive" dilemma that Justice Scalia insists is only
compounded by the Court's current practice of looking to the viewpoint of
both the declarant and the interrogator? 06
Whether or not the trial court actually needs to undertake such inquiry
depends on whether the off-duty officer is actually an agent of law
enforcement at all. Should the court somehow accept the prosecutor's
argument and find that the clerk's statements were not made to a law
enforcement agent, there is the possibility that the statement will be viewed
as non-testimonial altogether. Despite the apparent weakness of arguing
that the off-duty officer should not be viewed as an arm of law enforcement
102. This in itself is not a surefire way to ensure admissibility, as the Court had not yet ruled
on this. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2 (noting that "[o]ur holding today makes it unnecessary to
consider whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel
are 'testimonial"').
103. Chief among these reasons may be the fact that the officer did place the defendant under
arrest. But consider how statements made to privately-employed loss-prevention officers might
be viewed by the Court? What about statements made to ordinary civilians making citizen's
arrests?
104. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160-61.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court claims one affirmative virtue for its focus
on the purposes of both the declarant and the police: It 'ameliorates problems that . .. arise' when
declarants have 'mixed motives.' I am at a loss to know how. Sorting out the primary purpose of
a declarant with mixed motives is sometimes difficult. But adding in the mixed motives of the
police only compounds the problem. Now courts will have to sort through two sets of mixed
motives to determine the primary purpose of an interrogation.") (citation omitted). Scalia is not
the only commentator to have acknowledged the difficulties inherent in the Court's approach.
See, e.g., Moreno, supra note 77, at 1216 ("The Bryant decision has amplified the confrontation
confusion.").
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for Confrontation Clause purposes, the Court has extended similar
exceptions in the Fifth Amendment context.'o
In terms of an "ongoing emergency" analysis, the trial court would be
without much in the way of guidance. For one, how seriously can a
prosecutor contend that the theft of a television constitutes an "ongoing
emergency"? In this scenario, it seems that there is little, if any, possibility
of physical danger posed to anyone.
On the other hand, the clerk's statements do satisfy several of the
criteria the Court found determinative in Davis.10 8 Here, (1) the clerk was
"speaking about events as they were actually happening," as the television
was being brought to the suspect's car,109 (2) the statements were not
formal, as they were made between a store clerk and a man in plainclothes
asking about the possibly stolen merchandise while standing in the store
itself, and (3) the "elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve
the present emergency."" 0
While the use of a dictionary to address a legal issue is a questionable
practice, the definition of "emergency" may be worth considering. The
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "emergency" as "an unforeseen
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate
action.""' A second definition is also provided: "[A]n urgent need for
assistance or relief."ll 2  Under these definitions, it seems that the theft
hypothetical may well suffice. Under the Court's current Confrontation
Clause law, the answer is less clear. This makes clear the problem of an
107. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990), in which the Court held that an
undercover law enforcement officer was not required to provide Miranda warnings to an
incarcerated suspect prior to asking the suspect questions that could result in incriminating
responses. It would seem that, for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis, the same logic
underpinning Perkins could apply. After all, a declarant speaking to an undercover officer should
have little, if any, expectation that his statements would be used in a criminal prosecution, as the
declarant is presumably unaware that he is speaking with law enforcement. Thus, if a trial court
is to embrace a declarant-centered approach, as Justice Scalia suggests is proper, then the
declarant's statements would lack certain testimonial qualities of those made by one knowingly
speaking to the police. Should the declarant's statements be viewed as non-testimonial?
108. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006).
109. Admittedly, this might be a point of contention. Would the "emergency" cease once the
suspect exited the store? Would it endure until the suspect drove away in his vehicle? In Davis,
the Court noted, in dicta, that as soon as the defendant drove away from the premises, the
emergency "appears to have ended." Id. at 828. The victims' responses to the operator's
questions were, from that point on, probably testimonial. Id. at 828-29.
110. Id. at827.
111. Emergency Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/emergency (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
112. Id.
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uncertain set of factors for identifying an "ongoing emergency" all the
more bemusing.
Consider another hypothetical that presents facts a court would be
more willing to view as an emergency. Say that a confidential informant
working for Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is also a
member of La Mara Salvatrucha (commonly known as "MS-13"), the
ruthless' transnational gang comprised largely of Central American
immigrants. Assume that the informant learns that two MS-13 gang
members intend to detonate a grenade the next day at San Francisco's
Dolores Park.' 13 The informant learns that the MS-13 members' goal is to
injure members of a rival gang, Nortenos, who plan to attend a barbecue at
the park at the time.
Realizing the potential for harm to the public, the informant
immediately contacts ICE agents and notifies them of the gang's plan. He
also informs them that, on this particular occasion, the gang members have
already left at least one active grenade at the scene of the planned
detonation. The rationale for doing so, he explains, is the gang members'
fear of an impending raid at one of their homes by law enforcement.
ICE agents immediately contact the San Francisco Police Department
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"),
and officers from all three organizations respond to Dolores Park, where
they find three live grenades located precisely in the place the informant
claimed they would be. Investigators have the explosives dusted for
fingerprints and swabbed for DNA, but they are unable to produce any
significant match. Further, for whatever reason, there is no additional
physical evidence that links the explosives to members of MS-13.
In addition to the lack of evidence linking the grenades to the gang
members, the case against MS-13 becomes weaker when, just days after the
explosives were found, the informant is fatally wounded in a drive-by
shooting led by Nortenos-an ironic turn given that mere days before, it
was the actions of this informant that potentially saved the lives of his
assassins.
Nevertheless, the Assistant United States Attorney preparing a federal
RICO indictment targeting members of MS-13 hopes to rely on the
statements of the informant in support of attempted murder and conspiracy
to commit murder charges against members of the gang. The federal
113. This hypothetical is loosely based on actual reports of MS-13 gang members plotting to
detonate a grenade in Dolores Park. See Evan Hill, Feds Complain that S.F.'s Sanctuary City
Policies Impeded Investigation of Latino Gang, SF WEEKLY (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://www.sfweekly.com/2009-10-21/news/cop-blocked-feds-complain-that-s-f-s-sanctuary-city-
policies-impeded-investigation-of-latino-gang/.
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prosecutor might be comfortable relying on the mere circumstantial
evidence in his presentation to the grand jury, but he believes that he will
need to rely on the informant's statements at trial in order to support the
charges linked to this particular incident.
Because there exist no recorded conversations made by gang members
pertaining to this incident, the prosecutor knows that he cannot rely on
statements in furtherance of a conspiracy, 114 and he hopes to rely solely on
the found explosives, the fact that the rival gang was going to have a
barbecue there the following day, and the informant's statements to ICE
agents in order to support the charges. The grand jury returns the
indictment and, in the course of submitting the first set of motions in limine
to the trial court, he asserts that the informant's statements to the ICE agent
regarding the grenades were "non-testimonial" in that they fall under the
"ongoing emergency" exception. In support of this proposition, the
prosecutor cites to Davis and Bryant, insisting that the presence of
explosives in Dolores Park surely posed a threat to the public.
The defense attorney counters this reasoning, arguing that to make
such a ruling would amount to the court interpreting this exception too
broadly. What if it had rained on the day the gang members intended to
detonate the explosives, thereby canceling the barbecue and other activities
in the park? What if the explosives were non-active and actually posed no
threat? What if the basis for the informant's knowledge was unreliable,
and it was actually the informant who planted the explosives in the park
and fabricated a story of MS-13 gang involvement so as to implicate others
in the crime, for whatever reason? Because the declarant was never subject
to cross-examination and is no longer available, the defense attorney
argues, how can we ensure the reliability of his statements?
The defense attorney then alludes to a hypothetical example in which
an unavailable declarant reports vague bomb threats made by phone. The
threats made surround a sporting event taking place not the following day,
but perhaps a week later. Assume, the attorney argues, that police are not
able to locate and resolve the threat until mere hours before the bomb is
supposed to detonate, at which time the suspect is finally located and
apprehended. Does this mean that every statement made by the declarant
to police regarding the incident between his initial declaration and the
resolution of the issue approximately one week later would fall under the
ongoing emergency exception? What if the police never actually located
114. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Note that had any such statement existed, it would
presumably be admissible over any Confrontation Clause objection, as the Crawford ruling
explicitly acknowledged that statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy were not testimonial.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
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any such explosives, and the person making the threats was only charged
with making terrorist threats? Did an emergency actually exist? In such an
instance, how would one mark the contours of such an "emergency"?
In light of the arguments made by counsel, how should the judge rule?
And on what basis should he make his ruling? Bryant provides little
guidance on this matter. Yet such situations are not altogether impossible,
and there is little doubt that scenarios which may or may not be
characterized as emergencies are considered by criminal trial courts
throughout the United States every day, hence the need for a carefully-
delineated set of guidelines for courts to follow.
III. "Left in the Dark"
As one commentator suggested, some judges likely feel an inclination
to look toward other criminal evidence exceptions when conducting an
ongoing emergency analysis. 1 5 Together, the Fourth Amendment's
"exigency exception" and the Fifth Amendment's "public safety exception"
provide a good starting point from which one can begin to formulate
standards to apply in the Sixth Amendment context.
A. Looking to Other Constitutional Exceptions: The Fourth Amendment
In Mincey v. Arizona, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he need to
protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what
would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." 1 6 There,
plainclothes police officers were conducting a narcotics raid on an
apartment. During the raid, an officer was shot and killed, and three other
people in the apartment, including the defendant, were wounded. Pursuant
to a departmental policy that prohibited police officers from investigating
incidents in which they were involved, the officers did not conduct any
search of the apartment other than briefly looking around for other victims
following the shootings. Roughly ten minutes later, homicide investigators
arrived and conducted an exhaustive four-day warrantless search of the
apartment, which revealed 200 to 300 items seized by the investigators.
Among the seized evidence were guns, bullets, shell casings, narcotics, and
various drug-related paraphernalia. The defendant was subsequently
indicted and convicted of multiple charges, including murder.
In considering the admissibility of the evidence supporting the
conviction, the United States Supreme Court held that the officers' initial
warrantless search for possible victims was justifiable, but that the
115. Fisher, supra note 52, at 589-90.
116. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (internal citation omitted).
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homicide investigators' subsequent four-day search was unconstitutional
given that the emergency had ceased."' 7  The Court rejected the state's
argument that the nature of the offense at issue-a homicide-justified a
categorical exception to the warrant requirement based on the need for
immediate action. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
acknowledged that "[ilt simply cannot be contended that this search was
justified by any emergency threatening life or limb," noting that all persons
in the apartment were located before the homicide investigators arrived."19
Thus, "a four-day search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping
up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns
that justify an emergency search."l20
While the facts of Mincey failed to amount to an emergency, the Court
has contemplated other scenarios in which it found such a label justified,
thereby establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. In Brigham
City v. Stuart, the Court held that law enforcement officers may proceed
into a home without a warrant "to render emergency assistance to an
injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury," so long
as the officers have an "objectively reasonable basis for believing that an
occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury."l 21
There, the officers had responded to a late night house party and, upon
arrival, observed a fistfight involving a juvenile and four adults.122 Rather
than obtaining permission to enter the house, the officers forced their way
in to break up the fight.123
In arriving at its holding, the Court distinguished the facts of the case
from those of another, Welsh v. Wisconsin,124 in which it declined to find an
emergency where the only potential justification for one was a need to
preserve evidence-that of a suspect's blood-alcohol level.125  In
rationalizing the finding of an emergency in Brigham City, Justice Roberts
explained that "[t]he role of a peace officer includes preventing violence
and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties."' 26
117. Id. at 392-93.
118. Id. at 392-94.
119. Id. at 393.
120. Id.
121. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
122. Id. at 400-01.
123. Id at 401.
124. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
125. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 406.
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In Michigan v. Fisher, officers responded to the scene of a residential
disturbance. 12 7  Upon arriving at the residence in question, the officers
observed a damaged pickup truck in the driveway, blood on the hood of the
vehicle, three broken windows on the exterior of the house, and the
defendant inside the house, screaming and throwing things. 128  After
observing that the defendant had a cut on his hand, and out of concern that
the defendant might be throwing the objects at another person inside the
home, the officers approached the front door and offered medical
attention.129 When the defendant refused, one of the officers forced his
way into the home, only to see the defendant pointing a gun at him.13 0 The
defendant was eventually taken into custody and charged with assault with
a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony.' 3'
In finding that the officer's warrantless entry into the residence did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court cited both Mincey and Brigham
City, noting that the emergency exception "does not depend on the officers'
subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating
when the emergency arises. It requires only 'an objectively reasonable
basis for believing' that 'a person within [the house] is in need of
immediate aid."' 1
32
Finally, there is Kentucky v. King, a recent case in which officers
observed a suspected drug dealer enter an apartment from which the
officers were able to smell marijuana emanating. 13 3 After knocking, the
officers heard what they perceived to be evidence being destroyed inside
the apartment. 13 4 The Court upheld the officers' subsequent warrantless
entry.135 The majority's holding relied on the fact that the officers did not
engage in any actual or threatened Fourth Amendment violation prior to
their warrantless entry.136
Perhaps more relevant is Justice Ginsburg's dissent, where she
specifies the limits for what might constitute an emergency. 3 1 "[C]arefully
127. Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 547 (2009) (per curiam).
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Id. at 548 (internal citations omitted).
133. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2011).
134. Id
135. Id. at 1863.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1864-65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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delineated," Ginsburg explains, "the [exigency] exception should govern
only in genuine emergency situations. Circumstances qualify as 'exigent'
when there is an imminent risk of death or serious injury, or danger that
evidence will be immediately destroyed, or that a suspect will escape."
This is, in fact, quite a broad exception, and Ginsburg's specified limits are
instructive in drawing the Confrontation Clause exception narrowly enough
to avoid potential criticisms.
B. Looking to Other Constitutional Exceptions: The Fifth Amendment
Cases describing the Fifth Amendment's "public safety exception" to
Miranda warnings employ language similar to that in the aforementioned
Fourth Amendment cases.' 39 In New York v. Quarles, a woman informed
police shortly after midnight that she had just been raped by an armed man
who had fled into a nearby twenty-four-hour grocery store with the
weapon.14 0  Upon entering the store, one of the officers found the
defendant, who matched the description given by the victim.' 4 1 Four
officers took the defendant into custody, handcuffed him, and searched him
for the gun, to no avail.142  Without providing the defendant Miranda
warnings, the officers questioned the defendant about the whereabouts of
the weapon.14 3 The defendant orally directed the officers to the weapon.144
The trial court suppressed the weapon and the defendant's unwarned
statements on Miranda grounds, though the Supreme Court ultimately
reversed this ruling, citing a "public safety exception." 4 5 In this case, the
police "were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the
whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason to believe the suspect
had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in the
supermarket," explained Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority. 4 6 "So
long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its
actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to
138. Id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
139. For purposes of this paper, Miranda requirements are viewed as constitutionally based in
light of the Court's ruling in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
140. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651-52 (1984).
141. Id. at 652.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id
145. Id. at 652-53, 655-56.
146. Id. at 657.
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the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or
employee might later come upon it." 47
In dissent, Justice Marshall raised a simple yet effective criticism of
the exception: If there had truly been a public safety concern, why could
the cops not simply find the weapon and protect the public?l 4 8 Marshall
notes, "If trickery is necessary to protect the public, then the police may
trick a suspect into confessing. While the Fourteenth Amendment sets
limits on such behavior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or our decision in
Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort of emergency questioning. All the
Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced statements at
trial." 49
Both in Quarles and in the years since, the Court has done little to
provide any specific definition for "emergency" in a Fifth Amendment
context. "The precise boundaries of the public-safety exception are
difficult to ascertain-the Court has not clarified Quarles, leaving it to
lower courts instead to reach conflicting fact-sensitive outcomes," notes
Professor Dressler.15 0  All we are sure of is that "there must be an
'objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from [an]
immediate danger'; there must exist an 'exigency requiring immediate
action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a
serious crime,"' and "the questions asked by the police in such
circumstances must be 'reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety. 5'
With these examples, limits, and criticisms in mind, we now turn back
to the Confrontation Clause.
C. A Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test
Because of the wide variety of circumstances likely to result in what
might be perceived as an ongoing emergency, it is extraordinarily difficult
to formulate any sort of bright-line rule that can be applied to distinguish an
ongoing emergency from a situation in which the statements offered by a
declarant are deemed testimonial. Despite this difficulty, Justice
Ginsburg's definition of "exigent circumstances," as noted above, is both a
flexible and relatively straightforward way to define an "ongoing
emergency": "[W]hen there is an imminent risk of death or serious injury,
147. Id
148. Id. at 675-76.
149. Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATION (4th ed. 2006).
151. Id. (no citation offered, though presumably quoting from the text of Quarles).
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or danger that evidence will be immediately destroyed, or that a suspect
will escape."l 5 2
Justice Ginsburg not only voted with the majority in Crawford, she
also dissented in Bryant, and has been a strong opponent of Bryant '.s
creation of "an expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent
crimes."l 5 3 Whether Justice Ginsburg would be more willing to embrace
an actual definition that she personally authored-as it pertains to the
Fourth Amendment-is not clear. If nothing else, however, having an
actual definition is useful in that it guides lower courts and assures them of
the limits of this exception. Further, the definition she offers is
accommodated well by the following totality-of-the-circumstances test.
Per Davis, statements are non-testimonial "when made in the course of
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet
an ongoing emergency."1 54  In order to determine whether there is an
ongoing emergency, the court must examine the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. There are six factors relevant
to this determination: (1) The risk of death or serious injury; (2) the danger
that evidence will be immediately destroyed or that a suspect will escape;
(3) whether the interrogation takes place in an exposed public area; (4)
whether the declarant is capable of forming a purpose; (5) how remote in
time the statement is to the event it describes; and (6) the formality of the
statement.
The first two factors are taken directly from Justice Ginsburg's dissent
in King.'55 Where there is a high risk of death or serious injury posed to
either the declarant or interrogator, it seems doubtful that labeling the
situation an "emergency" would be perceived as a misnomer. Further,
there is more of an assurance that, under such circumstances, such
statements likely would be reliable in that the declarant would be under the
stress of excitement and less able to fabricate his statement. Such logic
finds support in the justifications for the "excited utterance" exception to
the hearsay rule,15 6 and the same logic applies to factor four of this test.
152. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1864 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
153. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
154. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
155. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1864-65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
156. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note ("The theory of Exception [paragraph] (2)
is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the
capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication. 6 Wigmore § 1747,
p. 135. Spontaneity is the key factor in each instance, though arrived at by somewhat different
routes.").
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Factor four, however, is to allow for this consideration to be advanced in
potential emergencies where a risk of death or serious injury might not be
posed yet the circumstances are arguably exigent, such as the possibility of
a grand theft suspect escaping.
Factor two is based on similar concerns. Namely, it is less likely for
there to be a high degree of unreliability in situations in which a declarant
is making statements to an officer not for the purpose of aiding in later
prosecution, but instead to ensure that the evidence itself is recovered or
that the suspect does not get away. This is, admittedly, less reliable, as
there may well be overlapping concerns: What is, after all, the purpose of
preserving the evidence or detaining the suspect, if not to subject him to
criminal prosecution?
One argument might be that, in the case of the theft hypothetical
above, the declarant store clerk is concerned with recovering the
merchandise and not sustaining a loss. Further, the declarant will likely
want to identify the thief so as to be aware of who not to allow in her store
in the future, as well as to be able to exclude others from false accusation.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that use of the word "evidence" does in and
of itself suggest criminal prosecution, and for that reason, this factor needs
to be weighed with that in mind.
The third factor, whether the interrogation takes place in an exposed
public area, is significant in part because of the safety concerns. If the
officers have less of an opportunity to relocate the interrogation to a more
formal setting, it is likely the result of a need to quell some sort of urgent
crisis. This factor is closely linked with factor six, formality, for this very
reason. If the declarant is in an open public area, as opposed to a
stationhouse interrogation room, there is a lesser degree of formality and
the statement offered is presumed to be less of the type "historically abused
by prosecutors as a means of depriving criminal defendants of the benefit
of the adversary process."157
Having discussed factors four and six and their interrelation to other
considerations, there remains factor five: How remote in time the statement
is to the event it describes. The rationale for this factor is straightforward:
The further in time a statement is from the action or event it describes, the
less reliable it is presumed to be. This is because an emergency does
eventually cease, and statements made distant in time as opposed to
simultaneously with an event are, quite obviously, less likely to be made in
157. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Robert P.
Mosteller, Softening the Formality and Formalism of the "Testimonial" Statement Concept, 19
REGENT U. L. REV. 429 (2007) (suggesting that courts readily embrace Justice Thomas'
definition of "formality" as provided in White).
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the course of an ongoing emergency. Thus, there exists more time for the
declarant to fabricate or second-guess his observations.
Without question, there are shortcomings to this test. For one, it
places great emphasis on considerations of reliability and temporal
immediacy. As Justice Scalia noted in Crawford, "[d]ispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing
with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the
Sixth Amendment prescribes."ss And yet, while it appears circular in its
reasoning, statements made during the course of an "ongoing emergency"
are trustworthy because they are made presumably for the purpose of
addressing the crisis at hand, and not to be used in lieu of testimony in a
future prosecution. By virtue of this alone, these statements are inherently
reliable.
The aforementioned six factors, while admittedly not exhaustive, help
to ensure both that the emergency is, in fact, ongoing at the time of the
statement's making, and that the statements themselves are, in fact,
reliable-the reason why non-testimonial statements are favored by the
Court in the first place. Under such conditions, the declarant lacks either
the motive or the presence of mind to fabricate a false story. When the
possibility for cross-examination leaves the veracity of one's account
unchecked, the presence of an ongoing emergency, as determined by the
aforementioned factors, helps provide an alternative check of sorts. These
factors are to reassure courts that the primary purpose of a declarant's
statement is not to create "an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." 59
A second potential criticism might be similar to that raised by Justice
Marshall in his Quarles dissent:16o Even if there is an ongoing emergency,
why not allow the officers to use the statements in order to respond to the
emergency itself? Why should the government be granted this exception to
a Constitutional rule when it is the emergency itself-and not the evidence
it produces-that they should be concerned with? In most cases, won't
being led to the actual cause of the emergency provide enough
circumstantial evidence-as well as other direct evidence-of a criminal
defendant's wrongdoing to support a conviction?
One response to such a criticism might be that these factors seek to
establish that police have a good-faith basis for their questioning, and are
not merely trying to stockpile evidence for later prosecution. Thus, there is
a good faith basis for the questioning-the resolution of an ongoing
emergency-and one might argue that it would amount to bad public policy
158. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
159. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
160. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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to require prosecutors to simply disregard such evidence obtained in the
process of addressing the emergency. However, this may not necessarily
be the strongest argument in favor of allowing the evidence, as public
policy alone may well be an insufficient basis for finding an exception to a
Constitutional mandate.
A stronger argument is similar to that offered by Professor
Friedman. 16 1 Specifically, at common law, there existed a forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing standard which prosecutors had come to rely on in the years
preceding Crawford. Some might interpret this exception to be properly
invoked for admitting statements such as those made by Anthony
Covington in Bryant. After all, Covington died as a result of the actions of
Bryant, who, under this line of reasoning, had thereby forfeited his right to
confrontation. This exception to the Confrontation Clause (and the hearsay
rule) is of great use in the very cases in which confrontation plays a
significant role-those involving witness intimidation and unavailability.1 6 2
Such an exception could undoubtedly be relied upon in the cases most
affected by Crawford-those involving domestic violence, gangs, and
homicides. Bryant would be no exception to this if not for the Court's
ruling in California v. Giles, which would require proof that Bryant
rendered Covington unavailable with the goal of preventing Covington
from testifying at trial. 16 3
Long before Giles, a defendant's preventing a witness from testifying
was sufficient to forfeit his confrontation right, even where it was unclear
why he rendered the witness unavailable. 164 Nevertheless, in the wake of
Giles, statements such as Covington's would be inadmissible absent a
showing that the defendant rendered the witness unavailable for the
purpose of preventing testimony. Thus, it could be argued that an ongoing
emergency exception is a response to the difficulties imposed on
prosecutors by Crawford and Giles.165 It could be further argued that this
approach-admitting statements made in the course of an ongoing
emergency, as they were in Bryant-serves as a countermeasure to the
crippling effect Crawford and Giles had on particular types of prosecutions.
161. See Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision, supra note 92.
162. Joshua Christensen, Beguiled by Giles: The Overlooked Duality of Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing, 62 ALA. L. REv. 645, 648 (2011).
163. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
164. See id. at 382-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
165. See id. In Giles, the Court, led again by Justice Scalia, held that unconfronted
testimonial statements made by a declarant unavailable at trial are not made admissible under the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause absent a showing that the
defendant intended to make the witness unavailable so that the witness could not testify in court.
Id.
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Conclusion
Given the amount of controversy raised since the ruling in Crawford
and the confusion that has ensued in this time, the potential for criticism of
the ongoing emergency exception and how courts might choose to apply it
is seemingly endless. Yet, despite any perceived weaknesses in proposals
such as that offered in this paper, one thing is certain: Crawford, while a
laudable attempt to restore Constitutional rights to criminal defendants as
they existed in 1791, is far from perfect.
Because ofthe abundance of Confrontation Clause litigation that has
ensued since Crawford-and is sure to continue in the future-arguments
such as Justice Rehnquist's should be paid ample consideration: If courts
are to employ a sweeping .change in a Constitutional standard, the Court
owes it to parties and judges alike to be clear on how to go about applying
it. Providing definitions and tests for relevant terms and exceptions would
seem a logical starting point.
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